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TIME AND THE COURTS: 
WHAT DEADLINES AND THEIR TREATMENT 
TELL US ABOUT THE LI TIGATION SYSTEM 
Catherine T. Struve* 
INTRODUCTION 
A judicial-conduct inquiry is currently underway concerning a failed 
attempt by attorneys for a death row inmate to make an after-hours 
emergency filing with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. Accord­
ing to charges filed with the Texas Commission on Judicial Conduct, 
the facts of the incident include the following: NIichael Wayne Rich­
ard's execution was set for 6:00 PM on September 25, 2007.1 On the 
morning of the 25th, the U.S . Supreme Court granted certiorari in 
Baze v. Rees, whi ch presented questions concerning the constitutional­
ity of execution by lethal injection? the method that would be used in 
Richard's case.3 Judges of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals were 
aware of the grant of certiorari in Baze and an email was circulated to 
them discussing the possibility of a filing from Richard's lawyers:� 
�, Professor. University of Pennsylvania Law School .  I thank the participants in an ad hoc 
workshop at the University of Pennsylvania Law School for their thoughtful comments during 
the initial stages of my research. and Edward Cooper. Shari Diamond. Stephan Landsman. and 
the participants in the 15th Annual Clifford Symposium for their very helpful comments on a 
draft of this Article. I am grateful to Ronald Day of the Biddle Law Library for his assistance in 
finding sources and to Melinda Harris for her excellent rese3rch assistance. Although r served 
as reporter to a subcommittee of the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure that developed proposed amendments to the national time-computation rules ( Fed­
eral Rule of Civil Procedure [hereinafter Civil Rule] 6(a). Federai Rule of Criminal Procedure 
[hereinafter Criminal Rule J 45(a) .  Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure [hereinafter Bank­
ruptcy Rule] 9006( a). and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure [hereinafter Appellate Rule 1 
26(a)) .  the views expressed here are solely my own. 
1. See First Amended Notice of Formal Proceedings. Inquiry Concerning a Judge. No. 9(i. 
Before the State Commission on Judicial Conduct [hereinafter First Amended Notice]. 9[ 7: TIle 
Honorable Sharon Keller's Verified Answer to the First A mended Notice of Formal Proceedings 
of the Texas State Commission on Judicial Conduct and Special Exception [hereinafter Answer 
to First Amended Notice]. 91 4. 
2. See Baze v. Rees. 217 S.W.3d 207 (Ky. 20(7) .  cerro granred. 551 U.S. 1192 ( Sept. 25. 2(07) 
(No. 07-5439) .  
3 .  See First Amended Notice. supra note 1. en 1 4: TIle Honorable Sharon Keller's Trial Brief. 
Inquiry Concerning a Judge. No. 96. Before the State Commission on Judicial Conduct [herein­
after Trial Brief] at 6-7. 
4. See First Amended Notice. supra note 1. 9[ 16: Trial  Briel'. silpra note 3. at 7-8 (suggesting 
that the email could have been understood to refer to an expected filing in the trial court). 
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Richard 's legal team, however, experienced computer problems and 
called the clerk's office shortly before 5:00 P M  to request that it accept 
the filing after 5:00 PM.S The court 's general counsel contacted Judge 
Sharon Keller, the Presiding Judge, to ask how to respond to the re­
ques t .° Judge Keller has stated that she "understood [the general 
counsel's question] to refer to whether the clerk 's office stayed open 
past 5:00 PM," a question to which she "said no in accordance with 
state law and . . . long standing custom."7  No stay was granted in 
Richard's  case, and he was executed later that evening.s  
It is not  evident that the Court of Criminal Appeals would have 
granted Richard a stay of execution: the court apparently denied an­
other death row inmate 's similar request .9 But that inmate, Carlton 
Akee Turner-having obtained a ruling on the merits from the Court 
of Criminal Appeals-was able to seek and obtain a stay of execution 
from the U.S. Supreme Court . 10 It also remains to be determined pre­
cisely why Richard 's lawyers were unable to employ Texas Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 9. 2(a)(2) ,  which provides that documents may be 
filed with "a justice or judge of that court who is willing to accept 
delivery." II Another judge of the Court of Criminal Appeals had 
been assigned to be in charge of any proceedings in connection with 
5. See First A mcnded Notice. SUfJ}'(f note I .  � 18: Answer t o  First Amended Notice. slIpra note 
1. 91 14(Q): id. 91 14(T) (asserting that "[iJt is still not clear whether" Richard's lawyers were. "in 
fact. encountering computer problems on that day but in any event the motion to stay based on 
the BII;:e casc was a simple document"): Trial Brie l'. sup/'{{ note 3. at 8. 
6. See First Amendccl Notice. supra note 1. 91 19. 
7. Answer to First Amcnded Notiet:. supra nott: L 9! 9. The state law referenced in Judge 
Keller's Answt:r is Section 6,)8.0U5 of the Texas Governmt:nt Code. Presumably Judge Keller 
meant to refer to Section 658.0 5(a). which provides in part that "[n10rmal office hours of a state 
agency art: from S a.m. to 5 1'1\1. Monday through Friday. TI1ese hours are the regular working 
hours for a full-time state employee." Section 658.0 5(b) provides. "If a chief administrator of a 
state agency considers it necessary or advisable. offices also may be kept open during other 
hours and on other days. and the time worked counts toward the 40 hours a week that are 
required under Section A5S.0 2." 
8. Answer to First Amended Notice. silpra note 1. 'l\ 10. 
9. First Amended Notice. SLIp/'({ note 1. 'l\ 28. 
10. See Miscellaneous Order, Turner v. Texas . .I'wy gmllled. 551 U.S. 1193 (Sept. 27. 2007) (No. 
ll7 A272) ("Application for stay ... granted pending the timely filing and disposition of the 
petition for writ of certiorari. Should the petition for writ of certiorari be denied. this stay shall 
terminate automatically."). Ultimately. in April 2008. a fractured U.S. Supreme COllrt denied 
relief to the petitioners in Bme. See Baze v. Rees. 128 S. Ct. 1520. 1526 (2008). Soon thereafter. 
the Court denied Turner's petition for certiorari. thus vacating the stay of his execution. See 
Turner v. Texas. 12X S. Ct. 2052 (2()()8). 
11. See Trial Briel. SlIlJnI note 3. at 8 (stating that Richard's lawyers had previously L1sed Rule 
lJ.2(a)(2) to makL' an ilfter-hours stav request in another death penalty case). 
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Richard's execution, and that judge stayed at court after hours on the 
25th;I2 but Richard 's attorneys did not make a filing with that judge. 1 3  
I open with this incident i n  part because i t  provides a n  extreme ex­
ample of the importance of deadlines and their interpretation: Dead­
lines and their implications for access to courts can truly have life or 
death consequences. I do not present the Richard case as representa­
tive of practice in the Texas court system. Nor does that approach 
reflect the pract ice in federal courts, which typically have systems in 
place to receive emergency fil ings in capital cases after normal busi­
ness hours.14 Indeed, the federal courts are, by statute, "deemed al­
ways open" to receive filings, although in practice, that statute should 
only be invoked in the most exigent circumstances. IS 
12. See iii. at L) (asserting that the assigned judge. the general counsel. "and several other 
members of the Court were at the CCA after hours" that day "and were willing to accept fil­
ings." and that the assigned judge was at the court until "shortly before" Richarci"s execution). 
13. The amended charges filed in mid-June 2009 assert that "neither [the assigned judge] nor 
the other judges who remained at the Court after 5 PM were aware that Mr. Richard's lawyers 
had called to ask whether filings after 5 pt\! could be accepted." First Amended Notice. SLIp/"({ 
note L <J[ 22. However, Judge Keller's trial brier. filed in mid-August 2()U9, asserts that the gt:n­
eral counsel told the assigned judge "[a]t approximately 5:00 pt\.! . about the call from Mr. 
Richard's lawyers asking that the Clerk's office remain open after 5:00 PM" Trial BrieL slipm 
note 3. at 10. 
14. See, e.g .. 2D CIR. R. * 0.2o(7)(i) ("Ouring non-business hours. emergency stay applications 
Illust be directed to an assigned representative of the Clerk (the duty clerk). whose telephone 
number is left with the courthollse security officers. The duty clerk must immediately advise the 
members of the assigned panel of the filing of an emergency stay application."). As 2D Clf{. R. 
0.28(j) states, 
In the event the members of the assigned panel cannot be reached by the dUly clerk. 
the duty clerk advises the judge of the court assigned at that time to hear emergency 
applications of the filing of an off-hours emergency stay application. Notwithstanding 
the provisions of subparagraphs 7(e) and 7(g)( ii). the applications judge may stay an 
execution until such time as the application can be placed before the assigned panel or 
the Court in banco 
15. 28 USC * 452 (2006) states in parI, "All courts of the United States shall be deemed 
always open for the purpose of filing proper papers. issuing and returning process. and making 
motions and orders." TIle national rules of procedure for the federal courts contain similar pro­
visions. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 5001(a): FED. R. Civ. P. 77(a); FED. R. CRHvl. P. 50(a): FED. R. 
App. P. 4s(a)( 2). Some courts have interpreted these provisions to permit litigants to make 
filings after court hours by seeking out a court official and handing the filing to that official in 
person. See, e.g., Casalduc v. Oiaz. 117 F.2d 915. 917 (lst CiT. 1941) (citing Civil Rule 77(a) for 
the principle that "[a] person wishing to file a notice of appeal after closing hours on tbe last day 
may seek out the clerk or deputy clerk. or perhaps the judge .... and deliver the notice to him 
out of hours. The notice of appeal would then be filed within the statutory period."): McIntosh 
v. Antonino. 71 F.3d 29.35 n.5 (1st Cir. IL)95) (citing Casaldlle for the proposition tbat "[a]fter 
hours, papers can validly be filed by in-hand delivery to the clerk or other proper official": 
noting that "some clerks' offices reportedly have established so-called 'night depositories' to 
accommodate after-hours filings": and declining to decide whether an item is filed at tbe time it 
is placed in such a depository after hours). Admittedly, � 452's history does not suggest that the 
statute was designed to address the accessibility of the courts for emergency filings. In nine­
teenth-century treatises. predecessor provisions are sometimes mentioned in the COllr,e of dis-
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My broader point is that such questions illuminate not only the 
treatment of deadlines, but also various assumptions concerning the 
litigation process more generally. The principle that federal courts are 
always open, even if only for true emergencies ,  might relate to a num­
ber of facts about the modern federal courts: that they are the courts 
of last resort for capital petitioners; on a different note ,  that federal 
judges routinely work beyond business hours on weekdays and also on 
weekends: 16 and, on a still different note, that with the advent of elec­
tronic filing, the federal courts are in fact always open both to receive 
and provide documents .!7 
These reflections suggest the thesis of this Article : examining the 
treatment of court deadlines can help to reveal how participants in the 
litigation system view their own roles and how they view the roles of 
cllssions concerning the terms of court and sometimes during discllssions of jurisdiction. See. 
e.g . . HOR,\CE ANDR.EWS. !'v[ANlI/\L OF THE LAWS ,\ND COllRTS OF THE UNITED STATES. AND OF 
THE SEVERAL STATES AND TER.RITORIES 9 (lR73) (in a section entitled "Terms of the Courts of 
the United States'" noting that '"[tJhe circuit courts. (I� courts of equity. are always open for the 
purpose of filing pleadings. issuing (Inc! returning process and cnmmissions. (lnd for interlocutory 
proceedings"): ROBERT DESTY. A i'vlAN! ;AI OF PHAC II('F IN THE CO! IRTS OF THE UNITED 
STATFS 5! (�th cd. It;SI) (section entitled "Courts always open ror certain purposes" listed 
under the topic heading "Circuit Courts-Jurisdiction"): GL()IH;E vV. FIELD. A TR.EATISE ON 
THE CONSTI"!! iTI(lN ,.\ND JURISDI(TI()N OF THF: COl'i-ZTS (IF THF: UNITU) S'IAIES 1.:16 (Phila .. T. & 
J.W. Johnson &. Co. It;R3) (discussing the ract that "circuit courts .. are always open'" in a 
chapter on jurisdiction). Both contexts suggest thai the purpose of courts-always-open provi­
sions was to address the power of the courts to act. SCI:' JOHN M. GOULD &. GE()f{(;E F. TIICKER. 
NOTES ON TI-H: REVISED STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES �!) (Boston. Little. Brown & Co. 
ISS!)) (observing that "while common-law judges properly exercise their authority only when 
holding a court. and have no power to sit in vclc'ition. vet courts of equity are always open. the 
chancellor's authority being personal . .. and capable of exercise equally in term time and in 
vacation"). This was. likewise. the view laken in a House report concerning the J 94X legislation 
that codified the present 2S USc. § 452. Sel:' H.R. REP. No. 30-30S. at A52 (1947). But even if 
§ 452 was not originally designed to embody the principle of openness to emergency filings. the 
statute can be read to support such a principle. It is not a principle that should be overused. 
Judges are most unlikely to wish to receive personal visits at home from litigants seeking to 
make emergency filings: indeed. such a practice \vOldd raise security concerns. Provisions that 
designate some other court official as the point of contact seem well-advised. But apart from 
these practicalities. there is appeal to tht: general principle that courts should always be open for 
the purpose of addressing truly exigent circllll1stances. 
16. Sec. e.g .. L(luren K. Robel. Cuse/oat! (lilt! JlldgiJlg: Judicial AdafJ{{/tioJls to Casc/olld. 1990 
B.Y.U. L REV. 3. i) (reporting the results of (I survey of federal trial judges. including the fact 
that "most reported routinely working 10-14 hours e3ch weekday. as well as part of each week­
end"): iii. at 3LJ (reporting the results of a surveyor feeler(ll appellate judges and noting that 
"r m Jost of the judges reported they coped with case load bv working longer and harder"). 
17. See Public Access to Court Electronic Rt:curd', Overview. http://pacer.psc.uscourts.govi 
pacerdesc.hlml (last visited Jail. lLJ. 2(10). Under ,I pilot program. the files available electroni­
cally through PACER will include not only written documents. but also audiorecordings of some 
court proceedings. a feature that further increases the courts' accessibility. See Press Release. 
Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts. Pilot Project Begins: Two Courts Offer Digital Audio Record­
ings Online ( Aug. O. 20(7). http://www.llscourts.gov/Prcss_Rcleases/digialaudioOSO(i()7.html(last 
visikd Jan. It). 2(10). 
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others. Deadl ines and their proper application form a vital topic in 
their own right. However, in this Article, I propose to examine what 
l itigation deadlines tell us about the way in which key actors in the 
litigation system relate to one another. My brief survey is meant to be 
impressionistic rather than comprehensive , addressing three overarch­
ing themes: how courts relate to Congress, how judges relate to parties 
and their lawyers , and how lawyers relate to one another. 
Part I I  addresses l egislature-court re lations .  I S  It first notes the 
ongoing debate-exemplified by cases such as Bowles v.  Russelfl9-
over the nature of statutory deadlines.20 It then discusses a rare sub­
set of such deadlines, namely, those limiting the time for the court's 
own action.2 1  It suggests that although courts take such deadlines se­
riously and are d i ligent in complying with them, Congress should cor­
relatively ensure that it considers the practicalities of judging when 
weighing the adoption of such time limits as a means of furthering 
policy. Part III  suggests that judges, likewise, should consider the 
practicalities of lawyering when they interpret and apply litigation 
deadlines. It first notes the systemic concerns that support the en­
forcement of deadlines generally, and it then discusses the factors that 
courts consider when deciding whether to extend a deadline in a par­
ticular case. Part IV briefly notes that the treatment of deadlines also 
illuminates our understanding of how lawyers relate to one another as 
colleagues. as l itigation all ies, and as opponents. 
I I .  COURTS AND LEGTSLATURES 
Among the thousands of deadlines that might come into play in fed­
eral litigation, there exist hundreds set by statute . The fact that a par­
ticular deadline is set by statute is significant. As Section A discusses ,  
sometimes that fact is dispositive, a s  when a court concludes that a 
deadline, because it is set by statute, is non-waivable and impervious 
to equitable exceptions .22 Although this Article will not attempt to 
survey completely the intricate doctrine on such questions, it will sug­
gest that it is useful ,  when applying a statutory deadline, to consider 
statutory purpose.23 The mere fact that Congress has set a deadline in 
statutory form should not necessarily cast that deadline as jurisdic­
tional ; a more nuanced account should take notice of the legislation's  
1 fS. See in/i'o tex t accompanying notes 22-132. 
ll). 551 U.S. 205 (20U7). 
2(). See in/i'o text accompanying notes 27-45. 
21. See inFu text accompanying n otes 46-132. 
22. See inFo note 3() and accompanying lext. 
23. See in/i'lI text a,:coll1pan ving n ote 45. 
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goals .24 Section B examines a small subset of statutory deadlines: in­
stances in which Congress sets a deadline not for litigants' action but 
for action by the court.2S Section B discusses a few recent examples, 
noting that while such provisions may serve important legislative 
goals, they should be carefully crafted with an eye to the realities of 
judges' work.26 
A. The Nature of Deadlines in Federal Litigation 
No survey of the law of federal litigation deadlines is complete with­
out a discussion of Bowles v. Rllssell,27 so I will begin by examining 
what that case and some others in its line have to say about the nature 
of l itigation deadlines in federal court . I will not discuss this question 
at l ength, both because it has been so much discussed elsevvhere28 and 
because the law in this area is still developing. However, a brief anal­
ysis is in order because Bowles emphasizes that appeal deadlines set 
by statute are for that reason jurisdictionaJ.29 And that emphasis on 
statutes implicates the topic I discuss in this Part namely, the relation­
ship between the courts and Congress. 
24. See id. 
25. See inti'a text accompanying notes 46-132. 
26. See id. 
27. 551 U. S. 205 (2007). 
28. See, e.g . . Scott Dodson . .Jurisriicliolla/iIY ({lid Bowles l'. Russell. 102 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLO­
C)lIY 42. 47 (2007) (arguing that instead of holding the fourteen-day deadline in 28 U.s.c. * 2107 
to be jurisdictional. the Supreme Court should have held it to be "mandatory but Ilonjurisdic­
tional"): Elizabeth Chamblee Burch. Nonjllristiicliorlality or 1l/equity. 102 Nyv. U. L. REV. COL. 
LOC)UY 64. 65 (2007) (responding to Dodson's proposal): Perry Dane. Sad Tillie: Thoughls Oil 
.Jllrisdictiol/ality, the LegalJllwgililltiull, {/J/(I Bowles v. Russell. 102 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOC)UY 
164.164 (2007) (contending "that time limits can . . .  be jurisdictional without being interpreted 
literally and peremptorily" ) :  E. King Poor, The .Jurisdictional Tillie Limit for on Appelll: The 
Wurst Killd of Deadlille-Except fiJI' All Others. 102 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 151. 151-52 
(2007) (,,[Pjractical experience teaches that the judicial system as a whole works far better-with 
greater stability and overall fairness-when the time for an appeal cannot be manipulated by the 
parties or overridden by the trial court and thus is treated as jurisdictional."): Scott Dodson, 
Appreciating Mandatory Rules: A Reply 10 Crirics, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 228, 238 
(2008) (responding to Dane. Poor, and Burch): Scott Dodson, The Fllililre of Bowles v. RusselL 
43 TULSA L. REV. 631. 632 (200S) (arguing that Bowles " leaves lower courts and litigants to 
wonder whether statutory limits in other areas can be waived or excused for equitable reasons. 
or whether they could come back to unravel the entire case for the first time on appeal"): How­
ard Wasserman .  Jurisdicrioll, kJerits, and Procedure: Thoughts on Dodsun's 1/"iC/lOtOIJlY. 102 Nw. 
U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 215. 222 (2008) (considering possible implications of the Court's discus­
sion of Bowles in John R. Sand & Gravel Co. v. U nited States. 552 U. S. 130 (200S»): Christopher 
W. Robbins. Comment. Jurisdiction lind Ihe Federal Rllles: Why the Time Has Come to Reforlll 
Finality by inequitable Deadlines. 157 U. PA. L. REV. 279. 284 (20()8) (arguing that '·[tJhe combi­
nation of a presumption that a requirement is nonjurisdictional with an extension of principles o f  
equity into the area of post-trial motions and notices of appeal would allow for a more just 
procedure for challenging a judgment"). 
29. See BOIv/es. 551 U.S. at 210-12. 
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The nature of a litigation deadline-i .e . ,  whether the deadline is ju­
risdictional-is important in at least two circumstances: first, when the 
litigant 's opponent fails to complain about the failure to meet the 
deadline, and second , when the failure to meet the deadline is raised 
but the litigant offers as an excuse for noncompliance some extraordi­
nary circumstance-in particular, reliance on misinformation from the 
court . In such instances, a nonjurisdictional deadline might not be en­
forced either because the opponent waived the untimeliness objection 
or because the litigant offers a sufficiently good excuse for noncompli­
ance . But a jurisdictional deadline must be raised by the court sua 
sponte and cannot be softened by judicially created exceptions such as 
the "unique circumstances" doctrine .30 
Just a few years ago, it seemed that the Supreme Court was inclined 
to narrow the range of litigation deadlines that it deemed "jurisdic­
tional." In Kontrick v. Ryan , the Court held that the time limit set by 
Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure (Bankruptcy Rule) 4004 for 
objections by creditors was not jurisdictional .31 The Kontrick Court 
suggested that "[c] larity would be facilitated if courts and litigants 
used the label 'jurisdictional' not for claim-processing rules, but only 
for prescriptions delineating the classes of cases (subject-matter juris­
diction) and the persons (personal jurisdiction) falling within a court's 
adjudicatory authority. "32 Likewise, a year later, in Eberhart v. United 
States, the Court concluded that the seven-day time limit for certain 
new trial motions under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure (Crimi­
nal Rule) 33 was nonjurisdictiona1.33 
But the Court took a different direction in Bowles. That case in­
volved a habeas petitioner who sought leave to reopen the time to 
appeaJ on the ground that he had not received notice of the entry of 
the judgment .34 Under both Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 
(Appellate Rule) 4(a)(6) and 28 U.S .C. § 2107(c),  the district court 
had the authority to reopen the appeal time, but only for a period of 
fourteen days.35 Unfortunately for Bowles, the district court's order 
granting the request specified that the notice of appeal could be filed 
on or before February 27, 2004-a day that fell ,  as it turned out, sev­
enteen rather than fourteen days after the entry of the court's order.36 
30. See 16A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL.. FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3LJ5U.1. 
at 203-05 (4th ed. 2(08). 
3l. Kontrick v. Ryan. 540 U.S. 443. 452 (2004). 
32. Id. at 455. 
33. Eberhart v. United States. 546 U.S. 12. 19 (2005). 
34. Bowles v. Russell. 432 F.3d 668. 670 (6th Cir. 20(5) .  
35. See 28 U.s.c. § 2107(c); FED. R. ApI'. P. 4(a)(6). 
36. See Bowles v. Russell. 551 U.S. 205. 207 (2007). 
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The U.S .  Supreme Court held that the notice of appeal. fi led on Feb­
ruary 26, was untimely and that the untimeliness constituted a jurisdic­
tional defect .37 Accordingly ,  the Bowles majority held that the 
l ateness could not be excused by Bowles's reliance on a date that the 
district court miscalculated.38 
The Bowles Court distinguished Kontrick and Eberhart by stressing 
that those cases did not involve deadlines set by statute. As the Court 
explained, 
Jurisdictional treatment of statutory time limits makes good sense. 
Within constitutional bounds, Congress decides what cases the fed­
eral courts have jurisdiction to consider. Because Congress decides 
whether federal courts can hear cases at all, it can also determine 
when, and under what conditions, federal courts can hear them. Put 
another way, the notion of "subject-matter" jurisdiction obviously 
extends to "classes of cases ... falling within a court's adjudicatory 
authority," but it is no less "jurisdictional" when Congress forbids 
federal courts from adjudicating an otherwise legitimate "class of 
cases" after a certain period has elapsed from final judgment.3,) 
In the context of appeal deadlines. Bowles has produced a few dis­
cernible trends and one nascent circuit split .  The lower courts are in 
consensus that statutory appeal deadlines are, under Bowles. j urisdic­
tional .-w And the trend in the caselaw is to treat appeal deadlines that 
are set only by rule and not by statute as non-jurisdi ctional:.!! Compli­
cations have arisen, however. with respect to appeal-related deadlines 
that are hybrids-i .e., deadlines that are set partly by rule  and partly 
by statute. For example. the Civil Rules set deadlines for making 
post judgment motions that toll the time to appeal in a civil case;42 the 
tolling motion deadlines are purely rule-based, but the appeal dead­
l ines tolled by such motions are statutory. Are the motion deadlines 
jurisdictional because they toll statutory appeal deadlines, or nonj uris­
dictional because they themselves are nonstatutory? To date, three 
circuits have answered this question, each in a different way.43 
37. Id. at 208. 
3K Id. at 206-07. 
30. Id. al 212-l3 (internal citations omitted). 
40. Sec, c.g.. Maranclola v. United States. 518 F.3d 913. 914 (Fcci. Cir. 20(1)). 
41. Scc, c.g.. United States v. Byfield. 522 F.3d -+00. 403 11.2 (D.C. Cir. 200K). 
42. See FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(4)(A)(i)-(vi) (listing. motions that toll appeal time in civil cases). 
43. Sce United States v. Comprehensive Drug. Testing. Inc., 5[3 F.3d 1085. 1101 & n.37 (9th 
Cir. 20(8) (holding that tolling-motion deadlines are jurisdictional. at least to the extent that the 
motions are to have a tolling effect). rc/7'g en balle grallled, 545 F.3d [106 (9th Or. 2(08) (stating 
that '"[tJht:: three-judge panel opinion shall not be cited as precedent hy or to any court of the 
Ninth Circuit"), opinioll Oil reh 'g I'll hane 579 F.3d 989. 904 (9th Cir. 2()09) (en banc) (adopting 
panel's reasoning on the issue of tolling-motion deadlines): Dill v. Gell. Am. Life ins. Co .. 525 
F . .3d 612. 618-[9 (8th Cir. 211(8) (stating that the Civil Rule SOrb) deadline is nonjurisdictional. 
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Of course , although the questions raised by Bowles may extend be­
yond the field of appeal deadlines to many other litigation deadlines, 
it  cannot be true that all statutory l itigation deadl ines are jurisdic­
tional simply because they are set by statute.  Statutes of limitation, 
for instance , are ordinarily  treated as affirmative defenses; they are 
thus waivable ,  and therefore nonjurisdictional. But statutes of limita­
tions for certain types of claims may be subject to special treatment. 
For instance , the U.S .  Supreme Court recently held in John R. Sand & 
Gravel Co. v. United Stales that the Court of Federal Claims' six-year 
limitation period is jurisdictiona1.44 In so doing, the Court suggested 
that the nature of the limitations period may be discerned by refer­
ence to the provision's purposes: 
Most statutes of limitations seek primarily to protect defendants 
against stale or unduly delayed claims. Thus, the law typically treats 
a limitations defense as an affirmative defense that the defendant 
must raise at the pleadings stage and that is subject to rules of for­
feiture and waiver. Such statutes also typica lly permit courts to toll 
the limitations period in light of special equitable considerations .  
Some statutes of l imi tations . however. seek not so much to pro­
tect a defendant's case-specific interest in time liness as to achieve a 
broader system-related goal, such as facilitating the administration 
of claims, limiting the scope of a governmental \Naiver of sovereign 
immunity, or promoting judicial efficiency. The Court has often 
read the time limits of these statutes as more absolute , say as requir­
ing a court to decide a timeliness question despite a waiver. or as 
forbidding a court to consider whether certain equitable considera­
tions warrant extending a limitations period.4:'i 
The John R. Sand Court's emphasis on the purposes of the statutory 
period suggests a useful refinement of the reasoning of Bowles . One 
might question whether, in al l  instances, a statutory provision is meant 
to set a jurisdictional deadline that is non-waivable and impervious to 
equitable exceptions. Sometimes legislators may indeed intend to 
limit the power of courts to forgive untimeliness, but in other in­
stances, the legislators' intent might be consistent with a contrary 
in terpreta ti on. 
but h old ing that when the other party objected to the motion 's unt imel iness before the court 
decided the motion but after the non tolled appeal time ran out. the appeal must be d ismissed for 
lack of jur is  dict ion ) :  N a t ' !  Ecological Found. v. Alexan de r . 496 F.3d 4fl6, 475-76 ( 6th Cir. 2007) 
( hold ing  that  the Civil Rule 59( e )  de adl ine i s  nonjurisdictional ) .  
44 . 1 28 S. Ct.  750. 755 (2008 ) .  
4 5 .  frl. at 7 5 3  ( i ntern a l citations omi t ted ) .  
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Such interpretive questions also arise in connection with statutory 
litigation deadlines that set time limits on action by the court itself. 
The notion of tight deadlines on certain types of court action is ,  of 
course , not new. In civil cases, for example, the Civil Rules have long 
set a presumption that a temporary restraining order (TRO) will ex­
pire after a very short time period .46 This limit, which in effect re­
quires either the TRO 's expiration or its conversion (after a hearing) 
into a preliminary injunction, is a necessary safeguard in light of the 
fact that TROs can be obtained ex parte.47 In criminal cases, both the 
Constitution4i> and implementing statutes49 guarantee a speedy trial, 
therefore requiring prompt judicial action.50 B ut the implementing 
statutes take account of the practicalities of litigation by listing a num­
ber of time periods that are excluded from Speedy Trial Act 
calculations .5 J 
During the past fifteen years, Congress has made a number of nota­
ble additions to the list of time limits on federal court action.52 For 
example, i n  the mid-1 990s Congress enacted both the Antiterrorism 
·Hi. Civil  Rule 65(b)(2) provides i n  part. "The order expires at the time after entry-not to 
exceed 10 days-that the court sets. unless before that t ime the court. for good cause. ex tends it 
for a like period or the adverse party consents to a longer extension . "  
47 . See French v .  Duckworth. 178 F.3c1 437 . 443 ( 7th  Cir. 1 9(9) ( "Both t h e  lO-day l imit  on 
TROs found in Rule 65(b)  and the analogous l imit  in the Norris-LaGuardia Act respond to the 
particular problems of ex parte proceedings . " ) .  re v 'd 0 1/  other groul/ds suh 110111.  Mil ler v.  Fre nch.  
530 U.S. 327 ( 2000). 
48. See U.S. CON ST. amend. VI .  
-1<). See 1 8  USc. *§ 3 1 6 J -3 1 74 ( 2006) :  see also FED. R. C R I M .  P. 48(b)  ( "The court may dis­
miss an indictment. information. or complaint i f  unnecessary delay occurs in :  (1 )  presen ting a 
charge to a grand jury: ( 2 )  fil ing an information against a defendant; or (3 )  bringing a defendant 
to triaL" ) :  FED. R.  CRIM. P .  50 ("Schedul ing preference must be given to criminal proceedings as 
far as practicable ." ) .  
50. See generally 3B CHARLES A LAN WRIGHT E T  A L  . .  FE D E R A L  PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 
� /-; 1 3 ( 3d ed . )  ( 2004) (d iscussing protections for defendant 's right to a speedy trial ). 
5 1 .  See 1 8  USc . * 3 1 6 1 ( h )  ( 2006 ) :  see also French . 1 78 F.3d at 444 (noting that the Speedy 
Trial Act "contains a long l ist  of exceptions" ) .  
52. In addit ion t o  the statutes d iscussed in t h e  text. examples include the Class Action Fair­
ness Act of 2005 (CA FA) ,  Pub. L. No. 109-2, 1 1 9 Stat. 4 ( 2005 ) ;  the Bankruptcy Abuse Preven­
tion and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 . Pub. L. No. 109-8. 1 1 9  S tat. 23 (2005 ) :  the Crime 
Vict ims'  Rights Act. Pub. L. 108-405, § 1 02 ( a) ,  1 1 8 Stat. 2260. 2261 (2004): and the Private Secur­
it ies Li tigation Reform Act of 1 995. Pub. L. 104-67, § 1 0 1 (a )-(b).  10<) S tat. 737 . 744 ( 1 995). For 
an example of the effects of CAFA's deadlines. see III re U-Haul I nfl. Inc .. No. 08-7 1 22 .  200<) 
WL Y024 14, at " ' I  ( D .C. Cir. Apr. 6, 2009) ( Rogers. J., disse n ting from denial of petit ion for leave 
to appeal ) ( reasoning that removal jurisd iction under CAFA depended in V-Haul on the unset­
t led question of " whether D.C. law permits a plaintiff to bring a claim on behalf of the general 
public as a non-class representative action," and concluding that "CAFA's time l imi tations on 
appellate review prevent th is court from certifying the question" to the D .C.  Court of Appeals ) .  
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and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1 996 (AEDPA)53 and the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).54 In these statutes ,  the time limits on 
court action seem to serve a general statutory goal of reorienting the 
role of the federal courts: in AEDPA, by limiting federal court delay 
in reviewing certain capital cases, and in the PLRA, by limiting fed­
eral court delay in reassessing the appropriateness of existing injunc­
tions concerning prison conditions. Short time limits on court action 
may require courts to alter their priorities , and they may limit courts' 
ability to thoroughly consider the merits of a given matter. Although 
the statutory time limits discussed here have not been invalidated on 
constitutional grounds, they do raise questions at a policy level. 
Both AEDPA and the PLRA illustrate the use of deadlines on 
court action as a tool for altering the role of the federal courts. 
AEDPA establishes a fast-track procedure for the review of habeas 
petitions of state prisoners who have been sentenced to death by the 
courts of a qualifying state.55 To qualify for the application of the fast­
track procedures,  the state must obtain a certification by the United 
States Attorney General that the state " has established a mechanism 
for the appointment , compensation , and payment of reasonable litiga­
tion expenses of competent counsel in State post-conviction proceed­
ings brought by indigent prisoners who have been sentenced to 
death," and that " the State provides standards of competency for the 
appointment of counsel" in such proceedings .56 For the first decade of 
its existence , the fast-track qualification procedure involved a some­
what similar standard57 concerning the provision of counsel on state 
collateral review, but it did not involve a certification by the Attorney 
General. During that period, it appears that no court actually applied 
the fast-track procedures to a state habeas petitioner.58 In 2006, Con­
gress amended the statute to make the substantive standard less strin­
gent and to vest the certification authority in the Attorney GenerapL) 
53. Pub. L. No. 104- 1 32.  1 10 Stat. 1 2 1 4  ( 1996) .  
54 .  Pub.  L. No.  1 04- 134. 1 1 0 Sta t .  132 1  ( 1 996 ) .  
55 .  See :;:3 U.s.c .  §§ 226 1-2266. 
5fi. 28 U.s . c. § 226S ( a ) ( I ) ( A ) .  (C) (2006 ) .  
5 7 .  Under l h e  current standard. t h e  counsel appointed for collateral stale proceedings cannol 
be the same counsel who represented the defendant a t  trial unless both the lawyer and the 
prisoner express1y so choose. See 28 U.s.c. § 226 J ( d ) .  1l1C pre-2006 standard went fu rther.  p re ­
sump tively ruling out ( as collatera l-proceeding counsel ) any  lawyer who had represen ted the 
prisoner in  the direct appeal. See Pub. L.  J 04- 132.  § 107 ( a). 1 1 0 Stal. 1221  (enacting origina l  
version of 28 U .s.c . § 22fi l (d ) ) .  
58. See John H .  B l ume. A ED PA :  Th e " Hype "  and the " Bile ". 9 1  CORNELL L. REV. 259. 
2N-75 (2006) .  
59. See USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reaulhorization Act o f  2005. Pub. L .  N o .  1 ( )9- l n . 
� 22fi5 . 1 2( )  Sta t .  1 92. 250. 
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The Department of Justice (DOJ) issued implementing regulations in 
December 2008.60 However, a legal aid organization sued to chal­
lenge the sufficiency of the notice that the DOJ had provided during 
the rulemaking process, and in January 2009, a federal district court 
enj oined the DOJ from putting the rule into effect "without first pro­
viding an additional comment period of at least thirty days and pub­
lishing a response to any comments received during such period."6J 
Citing this injunction, in February 2009, the DOJ announced its inten­
tion " to solicit further comment on all aspects of the final rule for 60 
days. "62 For the present, then, it seems that no state currently quali­
fies for the fast-track procedures. 
Nonetheless, it is instructive to contemplate how those procedures 
would work should they take effect in an actual case. If a state quali­
fied for the fast-track procedures and wished to apply those proce­
dures to a particular capital defendant, a court would ordinarily enter 
an order that appointed counsel for the defendant in the state collat­
eral proceedings.o:; The prisoner's execution date would then be 
stayed upon application to a federal habeas court.04 This stay would 
lapse if the prisoner failed to file a timely federal habeas petition;65 in 
contrast to other federal habeas petitioners (who face a one-year stat­
ute of limitations),66 fast-track capital petitioners must comply with 
the statute 's 180-day statute of limitations.67 And even if the peti­
tioner filed a timely federal petition, the statute directs that the stay of 
execution "shall expire if . . .  [the petitioner] fails to make a substan­
tial showing of the denial of a Federal right or is denied relief in the 
district court or at any subsequent stage of review."68 If such an event 
occurred ,  the statute states that "no Federal court thereafter shall 
have the authority to enter a stay of execution in the case , unless the 
court of appeals approves the filing of a second or successive applica­
tion under section 2244(b) . "69 The statute also circumscribes the 
60. See Office of the Attorney Gen era l :  Certification Process for State Capita l  Counsel Sys­
tems. 73 Fed. Reg. 75 .327. 75.327 ( Dec. I t.  20(8) (to be codified at 228 c.F.R.  pI. 26) .  
6 1 . Habeas Corpus Res .  Ctr .  v .  u.s.  D ep't  of Justice. No. C 08-2649 CWo 2009 WL 1 85423 . at  
*10 (N.D.  Cal .  Jan .  20. 2009) .  
62. Certification Process for State Capital  Counsel Systems. 74 Fed. Reg. 6 1 3 1 .  6 1 3 1  (Feb. 5.  
2009 ) ( to be codified at 28 c.F.R. pI. 26) . 
63 . See 28 U S c .  § 226 1 (c )  (2006 ) .  
64. See 28 U S c . § 2262(a )  (2006) .  
05 .  See 28 U S c. § 2262 (b ) ( I ) .  
06. See 28 USc. § 2244(d) ( l ) . 
07 .  See 28 U S c. § 2263 (2006 ) .  
08. 21) USc. § 2262(b ) (3 ) .  
6 lJ .  2 8  U S c .  § 2202 (c ) : see also 1 R A N D Y  HERTZ & J c\i\IES S.  L I E B MAN. FEDE R/\L H A H E A S  
CO R l' l l S  PR ACTICE & P ROCE D U R E  § 3.3c. at  144 n .64 ( 4th ed. 2(01 ) (suggesting that  t h i s  l im ita­
tion should be read narrowly in l ight of Fe lker v .  Tu rpin . 5 1 8  U .S .  6,'i 1 ( 19% » ) . 
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scope of the federal habeas review,70 and it sets a tight schedule for 
the district court . As amended in 2006,7 1 the statute mandates that 
the district court must reach final judgment "not later than 450 days 
after the date on which the application is filed, or 60 days after the 
date on which the case is submitted for decision, whichever is earlier . "  
The district court can extend the relevant period for an  additional 
thirty days, but only if it issues written findings that the delay is war­
ranted, taking into account certain statutorily specified factors.72 
AEDPA's fast-track procedures also set time limits for the court of 
appeals .73 The court of appeals must determine the appeal no later 
than 120 days after the last brief is filed.74 If rehearing or rehearing en 
banc is sought, the court of appeals must decide whether to grant re­
hearing within thirty days after the last relevant filing-the petition 
or, if one is required, the response .7:) And, if the court of appeals 
grants rehearing, it  must finally determine the case on rehearing no 
later than 120 days after entering the order that granted rehearingJ() 
With respect to each set of time limits , the statute explicitly pro­
vides for both enforcement and oversight .  The state can enforce the 
district court time limit by seeking a writ of mandamus from the court 
of appeals, and the court of appeals "shall act on the petition for a writ 
of mandamus not later than 30 days after the filing of the petition. "77 
The state can enforce the court of appeals time limit " 'by applying for 
a writ of mandamus to the Supreme Court ."78 In addition, the statute 
requires the Administrative Office of the United States Courts to sub­
mit annual reports to Congress on compliance with these time limits 
by both the district courts and the courts of appeals . 79 
AEDPA's legislative history indicates that the idea of such time lim­
its grew out of allegations concerning federal court delay in adjudicat­
ing habeas petitions by state capital prisoners. During legislative 
70. See 28 u . s . c .  § 2264 (2006) .  
7 1 .  See USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 20US. Pub. L. No.  ] ()9- 1 n .  
§ 507 ( e ) .  1 20 S tat. 25 1 (2006 ) .  Prior t o  the 2006 amendment. § 2266(b ) ( 1 ) ( A )  provided. " A  dis­
trict court shall render a final  determination and enter a final judgment on any appl ication for a 
writ of habeas corpus brought under this chapter in a capital case not  later than 1 80 days after 
the date on which the application is  fi led." See Pub. L. 104- 132.  § 107(a) .  1 10 Stat .  1 224 (enact­
ing original version of § 2266(b ) ( l ) ( A » . 
72. See 28 U . s . c .  § 2266( b ) ( 1 ) (C)  (2006 ).  
73. See 28 U.s.c.  § 2266( c ) ( l ) .  
74. See 2 8  U . s . c .  § 2266( c ) (  I ) ( A ) . 
7). See 28 U.S.c.  § 226il(c ) ( l ) ( B ) ( i ) .  
76. See 2 8  U.s.c.  § 2266(c ) ( 1 ) ( B ) ( i i ) .  
n .  2 8  U.s .c. § 2266(h) (4 ) ( B ) .  
7 '(1, .  2'(1, U . s . c .  § 2266( c ) ( 4 ) ( B ) .  
79. 2 8  U . s . c .  § 2266( h ) ( 5 ) .  2266( c ) ( 5 ) .  
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hearings i n  the 1990s , supporters of time limits decried long delays in 
the execution of state prisoners8o and asserted that time limits on fed­
eral habeas proceedings were an important way to address such de­
lays . For instance , Nebraska's Attorney General testified that 
" [f]ederal judges already have the tools to set prompt case progression 
standards and hold defense counsel to them. All too frequently,  this is 
not done. That is why statutory Federal habeas corpus reform is 
necessary. " S l 
In the case of the PLRA, the time limits on court action form part 
of Congress's effort to circumscribe the role of the federal courts in 
overseeing prison conditions . In addition to setting various limits on 
prisoner lawsuits generally, the PLRA also narrows the availability of 
systemic injunctive relief. As amended by the PLRA, 1 8  U.S.C .  
§ 3626(a) bars federal courts from granting preliminary or  permanent 
injunctive relief concerning prison conditions unless the court finds 
that the relief is narrowly tailored to remedy actual violations of fed­
eral rights and that the relief is the " least intrusive means necessary" 
for that purpose.S2 In making those findings , the court is directed to 
give " substantial weight to any adverse impact on public safety or the 
operation of a criminal justice system caused by the relief. " �3 The 
statute sets additional strictures on orders that limit the size of a 
prison population.8-l Section 3626(b) provides for the termination of 
existing injunctions. Under § 3626(b ) (2) , an injunction that was en­
tered without the type of findings required by § 3626(a) is subject to 
termination unless the court makes the required findings. Under 
§ 3626(b)( 1) ,  even an injunction that was entered with the requisite 
findings is subject to termination after two years unless the court de­
termines that the basis for the required findings still exists. 
Section 3626( e) contains a number of avenues through which the 
institutions that are subject to a prison condition injunction can en­
force § 3626(b) 's  termination mechanism. Section 3626(e) ( I )  provides 
that " [t]he court shall promptly rule on any motion to modify or ter­
minate" the injunction, and that " [  m ]andamus shall lie to remedy any 
KO. SCI', e.g . . Federal Habeas Corpus Refurm: Eliminating Prison ers ' Abuse of the Judicial Pro­
cess: Hearing 011 S. 623 Before the S. COl1lm. U/1 the Judiciary. 104th Congo 58. 00 ( 1 995)  ( state­
ment of Gale A. Norton. Atry Gen. of Colorado) .  
K L  Id. at 64 (statement  o f  D o n  Stenberg. Atry G e n .  o f  Nebraska) ;  see a/so id. a t  3 4  ( state­
men t of Dan Mora les. At! 'y Gen. of Texas) ( "While many of the Federal district courts in Texas 
expedite capital cases. i t  is not unusual for such cases to remain in  the district court for five to 
seven years . " ) .  
82. See 1 8  U S c .  � 3626 ( a ) (  I ) ( A ) .  ( a ) ( 2 ) .  
83.  I R  USc.  § 3626( a ) (l )�(2 )  (2006) ( setting limits o n  " prospective re l ief" and "pre liminary 
injunctive rel ief." respective ly) .  
,;;-1 .  Sec I I' U S c .  � 3626( a ) ( 3 )  ( set t ing preconditions for " prisoner release orcler[ s ]") .  
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failure to issue a prompt ruling on such a motion. "85 Even apart from 
this, the remainder of § 3626( e) provides an automatic enforcement 
mechanism. A motion to terminate lllJunctive relief under 
§ 3626(b ) ( 1 )  or (b ) (2) automatically stays the existing injunction "be­
ginning on the 30th day after such motion is filed ."86 As amended in 
1 997,87 the statute permits the court to "postpone the effective date 
of" this stay "for good cause," but only for an additional sixty days.88 
The statute renders any order interfering with the automatic stay 
(other than an order implementing the permitted sixty-day extension) 
immediately appealable.89 
Proponents of the PLRA's limits on injunctive relief relied on a 
number of contentions related to inmate litigation.90 With respect to 
structural-reform injunctions, bill proponents asserted that federal 
judges were interfering with the administration of prisons,91 making 
prisons more costly to run92 and endangering the public by requiring 
" the release of dangerous criminals. "93 Accordingly , the bill 's spon­
sors proposed to "curtail intederence by the Federal courts . . .  in the 
orderly administration of our prisons. "94 Opponents of the limits 
warned that the bil l  would "strip Federal courts of the authority to 
remedy unconstitutional prison conditions" and would constitute "a 
85. The provision concerning mandamus was added in  1 997. See Department of Justice Ap­
propriations Act. 1998. Pub. L. No. 1 05- 1 19 .  § 123, 1 1 1  Stat .  2440, 2470. 
86. 1 8  U . s.c.  § 3626(c ) (2 ) (A)( i ) .  If the motion to terminate is made under any authority 
other than § 3626(b) ( l ) or (b ) (2 ) .  the automatic stay comes into effect on the 1 80th clay after 
fi l ing rather than the 30th clay after filing. 1 8  U.s.c. § 3626(e ) (2 ) (A)( i i) .  
87 . See Department of Justice Appropriations Act, 1998, Pub. L. No. 1 05- 1 1 9. § 1 23 .  1 11  Stat.  
2440, 2470. 
88. 1 8  U.s.c.  § 3626( e ) (3 ) .  
89. See 1 8  U. s.c.  § 3626(e) (4) .  
90 .  For assessments of  the  assumptions underlying the PLRA, see ,  for example, Margo 
Schlanger. Inmate Litigation. 1 16 HARV. L.  REV. 1 555 .  1692-93 (2003);  Kermit Roosevelt I I I .  
Exh austion Under the Prison L itigation Reform Act: The Consequence o f  Procedural Error, 52 
EMORY L.J. 1 77 1 .  1 77 7  (2003) .  
9 1 .  See, e.g. , 1 4 1  CONGo  REc. 26,449 ( 1 995)  (statement o f  Sen. Abraham) (alluding to "con­
sent decrees, such as those in M ichigan under which judges control the prisons l iterally for 
decades") .  
92 .  See, e.g. , id. at 26,448-49 (statement of Sen.  Abraham). 
93. fd. at 26,448 (statement of Sen.  Abraham) ("[f]n other jurisdictions, judicial orders en­
tered under Federal law actual ly resul t  in the release of dangerous criminals from prison. " ) : see 
also Prison Reform: Enhancing the Effectiveness of Incarceration: Hearing Before the S. Comm. 
on the Jlldiciary. 1 04th Congo 5 1-52 ( 1 995)  [hereinafter .lilly 7995 Hearing] ( reproducing a resolu­
tion by the N ational D istrict Attorneys Associat ion) .  
94.  1 4 1  CONGo REC. 26.449 ( 1 995 ) (statement of Sen. Abraham) . For the views of an aca­
demic who supported enactment of the P LRA's curbs on prison-condi tion injunctions, see July 
f995 Hearing. supra note 93. at 1 90 ( responses to questions from Sen.  Abraham to Professor 
John J. Dilulio. Jr. ) .  
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dangerous legislative incursion into the work of the judicial branch , " lJS 
but their opposition ultimately failed. 
In this context, an automatic stay provision was presented as a way 
of ensuring that the federal courts ruled in a timely fashion on re­
quests for termination of injunctive relief.96 As a House committee 
report asserted, " [L]ocal officials are often handcuffed in their efforts 
to modify or terminate unnecessary and burdensome consent decrees 
[ or] other orders by judger s ]  who stonewall and simply refuse ,  for 
many months or even years, to issue a ruling on a request for modifi­
cation or termination. "97 During a House debate on a version of the 
bill, Representative Melvin Watt proposed an amendment that would 
delete the automatic stay, arguing that the automatic stay was an un­
precedented, "radical  change " that would burden " overcrowded, 
overworked Federal courts. " 98 Representative Charles Canady of 
Florida responded that the stay "is simply a mechanism to encourage 
the court to act swiftly , to consider these matters which are of great 
public importance ,"  and he intimated that judicial delay could endan­
ger the public: " What happens in many of these cases involving prison 
condit ions is, the court, unfortunately, will not expeditiously consider 
such motions for relief by the States and local governments. In some 
cases, that can result in dangerous criminals actually being let out on 
the street .  " 99 Representative Watt 's proposed amendment failed by a 
lopsided vote . I OO 
Unlike AEDPA's  fast-track provisions, which as of this writing have 
not yet been applied to any capital habeas petitioners, the PLRA's 
t iming provisions were soon tested. The Fifth and Sixth Circuits read 
the PLRA to leave federal courts with equitable authority to lift the 
automatic stay. WI The Seventh Circuit found that the PLRA fore­
closed such authority and held that the automatic stay provision vio­
lated separation of powers principles . 1 02 
95. 1 42 CONGo REC. 5 1 93 ( 1996) (statement of Sen. Kenned y ) ;  see also id. at 5 1 94 (statement 
of Sen. Simon) ( " History is replete with examples of egregious violations of prisoners' rights." ) .  
96. Supporters o f  a t ime l imit  inc luded the National District Attorneys Association. See 
Prisol1 Reform: Enhancing the Eflectivellcss of Incarceration: Hearing Befo re the S. Comm. all 
Ihe Judiciary.  104lh Congo 52 ( 1 995 ) .  
97 .  H . R. R E P .  No.  1 04-2 1 .  at 26 ( 1 995 ) .  
9i). 1 4 1  CONGo REC. 4366 ( 1 995). 
99. 1 4 1  Cow;.  REC. 4367 ( 1995) .  
iOO. See 141  O)N(; .  REC. 4368-69 ( 1 995)  (recording " ayes-93 ." "noes-3 13 , "  "not voting-
28" ) .  
10 1 .  See Ruiz Y .  Johnson .  1 78 F.3d 385, 395 (5 th  Cir. 1999) :  Hadix V .  Johnson, 1 44 F.3d  925. 
')30 ( 6 th Cir. t 99K ) .  
t 02.  Sec Frcnch V .  Duckworth. 17R F.3d 437 ,  447  ( 7th Ci r. 199\) ) .  rev '!l sllh 1I 01ll. M il ler  v .  
French.  53ll U.S.  3 7.7  (lOOO) .  
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In Miller v .  French, the Supreme Court held that both of  these ap­
proaches were erroneous. 1 03 The Miller Court first held that the Fifth 
and Sixth Circuits' interpretations of the statute were insupportable: 
"Any construction that preserved courts' equitable discretion to en­
join the automatic stay would effectively convert the PLRA's 
mandatory stay into a discretionary one . . . .  [T]his would be plainly  
contrary to Congress' intent in enacting the stay provision . . . . " 1 04 
Next, the Court held that the Seventh Circuit erred in holding that the 
automatic stay offended separation of powers principles. l OS The 
Court reasoned that § 3626(b) 's  termination provisions are permissi­
ble alterations of the propriety of prospective relief, and that 
§ 3626(e)'s automatic stay is a permissible way to effectuate the provi­
sions of § 3626(b ) . 1 06 B riefly focusing on the automatic stay's role as a 
deadline for court action, the Court stated that it had "no occasion to 
decide whether there could be a time constraint on judicial action that 
was so severe that it implicated . . . structural separation of powers 
concerns ."  1 07 As for the possibility that "the time is so short that i t  
deprives litigants of  a meaningful opportunity to be heard , "  that ques­
tion implicated due process concerns rather than separation of powers 
principles and was outside of the scope of the question presented. l Ot> 
The Court " le [ft] open ,  therefore, the question whether this time limit, 
particularly in a complex case ,  may implicate due process 
concerns . " 1 09 
Justices David Souter and Ruth Bader Ginsburg concurred in the 
majority's statutory analysis but not in its separation of powers analy­
SIS . In their view, 
[1]f determining whether a new rule applies requires time (say, for 
new factfinding) and if the statute provides insufficient time for a 
court to make that determination before the statute invalidates an 
extant remedial order, the application of the statute raises a serious 
question whether Congress has in practical terms assumed the judi­
cial function. I 10 
Justices Stephen Breyer and John Paul Stevens dissented, arguing that 
the PLRA should not be construed to remove all equitable authority 
1 03. See Miller v. French. 530 U.S .  327. 34 1 . 346. 350 (2000 ) .  
104. Id. a t  34 1 .  
105. See id. a t  346. 
1 06. See id. (" [Section 1 3626( e ) ( 2 )  merely reflects the change implemented by * 3626(b ) .  
which . . .  establish[ e s  1 new standards for prospective relief. " ) .  
t07 . Id. a t  350. 
1 08. Id. 
1 09. It!. 
1 1 0. It!. at 352 ( Souter .  L j o i ned hy Ginsburg. L concurring in part and d isse n t ing in part ) .  
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to suspend the automatic stay. I I I The dissenters began by noting "the 
extreme circumstances that at least some prison litigation originally 
sought to correct, the complexity of the resulting judicial decrees ,  and 
the potentia l  difficulties arising out of the subsequent need to review 
those decrees in order to make certain they follow Congress '  PLRA 
directives. " 1 1 2 While conceding that their interpretation might not be 
" the most natural reading of the statute's language" and that some 
legislators who voted for the PLRA would rej ect such an interpreta­
tion, l 13  the dissenters concluded  that the PLRA, 
when read in light of its language, structure, purpose, and history, is 
open to an interpretation that would allow a court to modify or sus­
pend the automatic stay when a party, in accordance with tradi­
tional equitable criteria, has demonstrated a need for such an 
exception .  That interpretation reflects this Court's historic reluc­
tance to read a statute as depriving courts of their traditional equita­
ble powers .  It also avoids constitutional difficulties that might arise 
in unusual cases . 1 1 4 
Time limits such as those set by AEDPA's fast-track provisions or 
by the PLRA's automatic stay mechanism may have the effect of reor­
dering the courts' priorities. Indeed, that is the intended effect of at 
least one of these statutes .  AEDPA's chapter on fast -track capital 
habeas procedures includes a provision that states this goal explicitly: 
" The adjudication of any application under section 2254 that is subject 
to this chapter, and the adjudication of any motion under section 2255 
by a person under sentence of death, shall be given priority by the 
district court and by the court of appeals over all noncapital mat­
ters . "  1 1 5 And both AEDPA and the PLRA, when authorizing limited 
extensions of their time limits on district court action, explicitly rule 
out , as a reason for extension, "general congestion of the court 's 
calendar . "  1 1 6 
The Miller Court noted the possibility that , in some circumstances, 
very tight deadl ines for court action may not afford enough time for 
I l l .  Id. at 36 1 (Breyer. J . ,  joined by Stevens, J . . dissenting).  
1 12 .  lei. at 355 ( Breyer, L joined by Stevens, J . ,  dissenting).  
1 13 .  Id. at 362 (Breyer. J . ,  joined by Stevens, J . ,  dissenting) C'l do not argue that  this interpre­
tation reflects the most natural readin g  of the statute's language. Nor do I assert that  each 
individual legislator would have endorsed that  reading at  the time. " ) .  
1 14.  fd. at 36 1 ( B reyer, J . .  joined by Stevens, J., dissenting) .  
1 15 .  28 U.s .c. § 2266(a ) .  
1 16. Compare 2 8  U . s.c. § 2266(b ) ( l ) (C) ( i i i )  (AEDPA fast-track provis ion ) ,  with 1 8  U S c .  
§ 3626 (e ) (3 )  ( PLRA au tomatic stay provision ) .  The PLRA language concerning court conges­
tion was added in 1 997. See Department of Justice Appropriations Act. 1 998. Pub.  L.  No. 105-
1 1 9.  § 1 23, 1 1 1  Stat .  2440, 2470. 
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thorough analysis of  the merits of  the relevant question. I I 7 In  extreme 
cases, as the Miller Court acknowledged, such enforced haste could 
raise due process or even separation of powers concerns. 1 1 8  Even 
short of these concerns, however, tight deadlines may have significant 
effects. 
For example ,  the imposition of a tight deadline on decision making 
can affect the content of the law. Another of AEDPA's time limits 
provides an example. In habeas cases to which the fast-track proce­
dures do not apply, 28 U .S . C. § 2244(b) sets stringent limits on the 
petitioner's ability to bring a second or successive petition. I 1 9  Such a 
petition can only be brought if the claim asserted in the petition meets 
one of two strict statutory requirements-either that "the claim relies 
on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on col­
lateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavaila­
ble " 1 20 or that , 
the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered 
previously through the exercise of due diligence; and . . .  the facts 
underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence 
as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by c lear and convincing 
evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder 
would have found the applicant guil ty of the underlying offense. 1 2 1  
Before filing a successive petition, the petitioner must seek permission 
from the court of appeals. 1 22 The court of appeals can grant this per­
mission "only if it determines that the application makes a prima facie 
showing that the application satisfies the requirements" set by 
§ 2244(b) , 1 23 and it must rule on the question "not later than 30 days 
after the filing of the motion. " 1 24 
In Tyler v. Cain, the Supreme Court interpreted § 2244(b ) 's "new 
rule "  provision. 1 25 The Court held that the phrase "made retroactive 
to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court" means held retro­
active . 1 26 In other words,  § 2244(b)'s "new rule" provision can only 
apply if the Supreme Court "has held that the new rule is retroactively 
1 1 7 .  See Miller, 530 U.S. at  350 (" leav[ingJ open . . .  the question whether [ 1 8  U .s . c .  
§ 3626( e ) ( 2 ) 's 1 t ime l imit .  particularly in a complex case, may implicate due process concerns," 
and not deciding "whether there could be a time constraint on judicial action that was so severe 
that it imp licated these structural separat ion of powers concerns" ) .  
1 18. See id. 
1 19 .  See 28 U.s.c.  § 2244(b) .  
1 20. 28 U . s . c. § 2244( b ) ( 2 ) ( A ) .  
1 2 1 .  28 U.s.c.  § 2244(b ) ( 2 ) (8 ) .  
1 22 .  See 28 U.s.c.  § 2244(b) ( 3 ) ( A ) .  
1 23 .  2 8  U.s.c.  § 2244(b) (3 ) (C) .  
1 24 .  28 U .s .c.  § 2244(b) (3 ) (O ) .  
1 25 .  Tyler v .  Cain, 533 U.S.  656, 656 (200 1 ) .  
1 26 .  See id. a t  662 (holding "that 'made' means 'held'  " ) .  
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applicable to cases on collateral review. " ln  In addition to analyzing 
the statute 's  wording, the Tyler majority relied on the timing of the 
§ 2244(b) mechanism, holding that the Court 's chosen "interpretation 
is necessary for the proper implementation of the collateral review 
structure created by AEDPA" : 1 28 
The court of appeals must make a decision on the application within 
30 days . In this limited time, the court of appeals must determine 
whether the application "makes a prima facie showing that (it] satis­
fies the [second habeas standard] . "  It is unlikely that a court of ap­
peals could make such a determination in the allotted time if it had 
to do more than simply rely on Supreme Court holdings on retroac­
tivity. The stringent time limit thus suggests that the courts of ap­
peals do not have to engage in the difficult legal analysis that can be 
required to determine questions of retroactivity in the first 
instance. 1 2l) 
The imposition of short deadlines for court action also affects the 
parties ' litigation timetable, and it can thus alter the dynamics among 
the litigants .  For example, Margo Schlanger has argued that the 
PLRA 's  automatic stay provision "accelerates the termination litiga­
tion in a way that sharply disadvantages plaintiffs" by requiring the 
plaintiff who is defending the injunction to assemble potentially com­
plex proof of the continuing need for the injunction within a very 
short period of time. 1 30 
Because deadlines on court action can have significant effects on 
the court . the parties, and the development and application of the law, 
it is important that the assessment of such deadlines be informed by 
an accurate sense of litigation realities. A recent study of post­
AEDPA habeas practice in federal district courts, for instance, finds 
that both noncapital and capital cases take longer post-AEDPA than 
pre-AEDPA. This study concludes that " [g]iven how long capital 
habeas cases presently take to resolve, the statutory 450-day time limit 
for resolving capital habeas cases from states that may qualify for ex­
pedited review under AEDPA will pose a challenge for courts . "13 1 In 
the districts examined by that study, "the average processing time for 
capital cases is well over two and a half times that long," and none of 
1 27. Id. at  662. 
1 28. Id. at 664. 
1 29 .  lei. (quoting 28 U .s .c. § 2244(b) (3 ) (C» ) .  
1 30 .  Margo Schlanger. Civil Riijhls InjuflclioNS over Tim e: A Case SlIIdy of Jail ([!ld Prison 
COlin Orders . 8 1  N.Y. U .  L. REV. 550, 591-92 (2006) .  
1 3 1 .  NANCY J .  K INe;  E T  A l. . .  NAT'L CTR.  FOR STATE CIS .  FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT: 
HAB EAS LITIG ATION IN U . S .  DISTRICT COURTS 60 (20ll7 ) .  http : //www.ncjrs.gov/pdffi lesllnij/  
gran ts/21 9559.pJf. 
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the thirteen districts studied "completed its capital habeas cases in less 
than 500 days on average, even excluding stayed time . " 1 32 
III .  COURTS, PARTIES, AND LAWYERS 
The preceding Part noted that the creation and treatment of dead­
lines can reveal both how legislatures think about the courts and how 
judges approach statutory deadlines . I 33 This Part examines the ways 
in which the interpretation and application of deadlines can illuminate 
judges' views of the roles of both litigants and lawyers . 1 34 The topics 
are related; as noted in Part II .A, a litigant's noncompliance with a 
deadline may sometimes have fatal consequences precisely because 
the deadline in question is set by statute and is for that reason re­
garded as jurisdictional. 1 35 This Part, however, will consider the 
broader question of deadlines in general. Section A notes the Ul1COl1-
troversial point that deadlines serve basic systemic needs :  without 
deadlines, no system of litigation could function . L Vi Here , the cl assic 
debate over rules and standards comes into play: a rational system wi l l  
often have rule-like time limits, but on occasion there i s  a value to 
softening those rules through the application of a standard that per­
mits tardiness to be forgiven. These standards for forgiveness are chs­
cussed in Section B . 1 37 
A. Systemic Concerns 
Deadlines serve key functions before , during, and after lit igation . 
Prior to litigation, a statute of limitations can spur the plaintiff to 
bring suit at a time when relevant evidence stil l  exists, witnesses' 
memories are stil l  fresh , and the defendant has not yet relied on the 
absence of suit .  After litigation commences ,  deadlines can keep the 
case moving by setting the timeline for initial pleadings and motions ,  
discovery , dispositive pretrial motions, and the like. Once a case 
reaches judgment , values of finality are served by the rel atively tight 
deadlines for making most post judgment motions and for taking 
appeals. 
1 32. Jd. 
1 33. See Sllpra text accompanying notes 22-132. 
134. See inti·a text accompanying notes 138-1 89.  
1 35.  See Sllpra text accompanying note 30. 
136.  See inti·a text accompanying notes 1 38-147. 
137.  See infra text  accompanying notes 1 48-1 89. 
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At each stage, deadlines might be softened to account for compet­
ing concerns .  Statutes of limitations might be tolled. 1 38 The court 
might extend the deadlines for various steps in the pretrial process. 1 3Y 
Timely filing of certain post judgment motions tolls the time to take an 
appeal. 1 40 The time to appeal can be extended for limited periods or, 
under certain circumstances, reopened . 1 4 1  Even after that time, the 
trial court can be asked to grant relief from the judgment. 1 42 
But all such extensions are subject to limits, and in some instances, 
the values served by a deadline are seen to be so important that exten­
sions are permitted only under special provisions-as is true for ap­
peal time l43-or not at all-as is true for post judgment motions. 1 44 It 
should be noted that the more rule-like a time limit is, the more im­
portant it becomes to select a realistic time frame. Post judgment mo­
tion deadlines are illustrative . The ten-day deadline previously set by 
the Civil Rules-effectively fourteen days in most cases because inter­
mediate weekends and holidays were omitted from the calcula­
tion 145-was widely thought to be too short for proper briefing of a 
post judgment motion in a complex case. 1 46 On at least some occa­
sions, a sympathetic district j udge , aware that extensions of the dead­
line were impermissible , delayed the entry of judgment so as to delay 
the period for post judgment motions. If one is to have a non-extend­
able deadline for post judgment motions, the better choice is to select 
a deadline that will be regarded as realistic. Happily, among the 
amendments to the Civil Rules that took effect on December 1 , 2009 
1 38 .  See, e.g . .  Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs. 498 U.S.  89. 96 ( 1 990) (discussing examples 
of equitable tolling) .  
1 39. See, e.g. . FED. R. CIv.  P .  6(b) (authorizing courts to extend many civil li tigation 
deadlines) .  
1 40. See FED. R. ApI'. P.  4(a)(4) (A) (providing that certain motions toll the time for taking 
civil appeals); FED. R. ApI'. P.  4(b)(3)(A) (providing that certain motions toll the time for taking 
criminal appeals) .  
1 4 1 .  See FED.  R. App. P.  4(a)(5)  (providing for extension of the t ime to take a civil appea l ) ;  28 
U.s .c. � 2107(c) (same); FED.  R. App. P. 4(a)(6) (providing for reopening of the time to take a 
civil appeal) ;  28 U.S.c. § 2107(c) (same) ;  FED. R. App. P. 4(b)(4)  (providing for extension of the 
time to take a criminal appeal) .  
142.  See F E D .  R. CIv .  P.  60(b)  (providing grounds for relief from a civil j udgment) .  
143 .  See F E D .  R. App. P.  4(a)(5)  (providing for extension of  the t ime to take a civil appeal ) :  28 
U.S.c. § 2 1 07 (c) (same) ;  FED.  R. App. P. 4(b)(4) (providing for extension of the time to take a 
criminal  appeal) .  
1 44. See FED.  R. CIv. P .  6(b) (2) ("A court must not extend the time to act  under Rules 50(b)  
and (d) ,  52(b) .  59(b), (d) .  and (e) .  and 60(b ) . " ) .  
1 45. See FED. R.  C Iv .  P. 6 (2009 Committee Note) (discussing the  version of Civil Rule 6(a) 
that was in effect prior to December 1 ,  2009) .  
146. See, e.g. . F E D .  R.  C IV .  P .  50  (2009 Committee Note) ("Experience has proved that in 
many cases i t  is not possible to prepare a satisfactory post-judgment motion in 10 days. even 
under the former rule that excluded intermediate Saturdays. Sundays, and lega l holidays. " ) .  
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are amendments that changed the post judgment motion deadlines in 
Civil Rules 50, 52, and 59 from ten to twenty-eight days . 147 
For many other deadlines, though, there is more play in the j oints. 
As discussed in the next Section, these deadlines can often be ex­
tended upon a showing of good cause or excusable neglect. 
B. Views of Lawyering 
Although the details vary depending on the specific deadline, many 
federal litigation deadlines can be extended if the litigant shows a 
good enough reason. The standard for an extension ordinarily centers 
on one or both of the terms "good cause" and "excusable neglect. " In 
applying the relevant standard, courts sometimes reveal assumptions 
about the role of a lawyer and how a lawyer should act . 
Civil Rule 6(b) , 1 4S Criminal Rule 45 (b) , 1 49 Bankruptcy Rule 
9006(b ) , 1 50 and Appellate Rule 26(b) LS I address such extensions . 
These provisions have general application, but as noted above, 1 52 they 
exclude particular deadlines from their scope. I S3 Among the dead­
lines to which Appellate Rule 26(b) does not extend are those for 
1 47 .  See FED.  R. C t v .  P. SO(b ) .  ( d ) :  S2 ( b ) : S Y ( b ) ,  ( d )-( e ) .  
1 48. The Civil Rules provide that 
[w] hen an act may or must be done within a specified time. the court may. for good 
cause, extend the time: (A) with or without motion or notice if the cOllrt acts. or if  a 
request is made. before the original time or its extension expires: or ( B )  Oil motion 
made afte r the time has expired if  the party failed to act because of excusable neglect. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 6(b ) ( 1 ). 
149. TIle Criminal Rules provide that 
[wJhen an act must or may be done within a specified period, the court o n  its own may 
extend the time. or for good cause may do so on a party's motion made: (A) before the 
originally prescribed or previously extended time expires; or ( B )  a fter the time expires 
if  the party failed to act because of excusable neglect. 
FED. R. CRJM. P. 4S ( b ) ( 1 ) .  
1 50. The Bankruptcy Rules provide that 
[e Jxcept as provided in paragraphs (2)  and ( 3 )  of this subdivision, when an act is re­
qui red or allowed to be done at or within a specified period by these rules or by a 
notice given thereunder or by order of court, the court for cause shown may at any time 
in its discretion ( I ) with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged if  the 
request therefor is made before the expiration of  the period originally prescribed or as 
extended by a previous order or (2)  on motion made after the expiration of the speci­
fied period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of excusa­
ble neglect. 
FED. R. BANKK.. P. 9006(b ) ( 1 ) .  
IS] . "For good cause, the court may extend the time prescribed b y  these rules o r  b y  its order 
to perform any act. or may permit an act to be done after that time expires." FED. R. ApI'. P .  
26(b ) .  
I S2. Sce supra text accompanying notes 143- 1 44. 
153. See FED. R. Ov. P. 6 ( b ) (2 )  ("A court must not extend the time to act under Rules SO(b) 
and (d) .  S2( b ) .  59(b) ,  (d) .  and (e) ,  and 60( b )  . . . . ") :  FED . R.  CRIM. P.  45(b)(2)  ( " The court may 
not extend the time to take any action under Rule 35. except as sta tee! in that ru le. " ) :  FE D. R. 
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taking an appeal; extensions of such deadlines are addressed sepa­
rately, by Appellate Rule 4 (and sometimes by statute) . I S4 
Under all of these Rules, including the appeal-time extension provi­
sions in Appellate Rule 4, the court's  analysis is likely to follow the 
path marked by the Supreme Court in Pioneer Investment Services Co. 
v. Brunswick Associates Limited Partnership . ls5 Pioneer Investment 
concerned a lawyer's failure to timely file  a proof of claim in a bank­
ruptcy proceeding, and it thus involved the interpretation of B ank­
ruptcy Rule 9006(b ) 's "excusable neglect" standard, L 56 but the lower 
federal courts have also applied the Pioneer Investment approach to 
the extension provisions in the Civil and Appellate Rules . 1 57 
Under Pioneer Investment, the availability of an extension " is not 
limited to situations where the fai lure to timely file is due to circum­
stances beyond the control of the filer" ; 1 58 some "inadvertent or negl i­
gent omission [ s]" can qualify as well . 1 59 
BAN KR. P. 9006 ( b ) ( 2 )  ( ' " 1l1e court may not  enlarge the time for taking action under Rules 
101l7 ( d ) ,  2003 ( a )  anu (d) .  7052.  9023 . and 9024 .'" ) .  1ne Bankruptcy Rules provide that 
[t)he court may enlarge the t ime for taking action under Rules 1006(b )(2). 10 1 7( e ). 
3002 ( c ) .  4003 ( b ) .  4004 ( a ) .  4007(c), 4008 ( a ) .  8002. and 9033. only to the  exten t and 
under the conditions stated in those rules. In addition . the court may e n large the time 
to file the statemen t  required under Rule lO07(b ) ( 7 ) ,  and to file schedules and state­
ments in  a smal l  business case under � 1 1 1 6 ( 3 )  of the Code. only to the  exte n t  and 
under the con dit ions stated in Rule 1007 ( c ) .  
FED. R. BAN K R .  P .  9()()6( b ) ( 3 )  (Supp.  2(09) .  Similarly. t h e  Appel late Rules provide tha t 
the court may not extend the t ime to fi le :  ( 1 ) a notice of appeal  ( except as authorized in 
Rule 4 )  o r  a pet i t ion for permission to appeal:  or (2) a notice of appeal from or a 
petition to enjoin .  set  aside. suspend. modify. enforce. or otherwise review an order of 
an administrative agency .  board. commission. or officer of the U nited States.  un lcss 
specifically authorized by law. 
FED.  R .  ApI'. P. 26(b). 
154. Extensions of the civil  appeals period are governed by Appellate R u le 4 ( a ) ( 5 )  and 28 
USC § 2 1 07(c ) .  These provisions permit an ex tension ( through the later of " 30 days after the 
prescribed t ime or 10 days after the date" of entry of the order granting the motion)  if. inter alia. 
( i )  a party so moves no l a ter than 30 days after the t ime prescribed by this Rule 4 (a )  
expires; and ( i i )  regardless of  whether i ts motion is  fi led before or  during the  30  days 
after the time prescribed by this  Rule  4 ( a )  expires. that  party shows excusable neglect 
or good cause. 
FED. R. App. P .  4 ( a ) ( 5 ) .  Extensions of  appeal t ime in  criminal cases are governed by  A ppel late 
Rule 4(b)(4) .  As to both civi l  and criminal  appeals. a u thority to grant or deny extensions is  
entrusted to the district court. See FED. R.  App. P.  4 ( a ) ( 5 )  ( civi l appeals ) ;  28 U S c .  § 2 107( c )  
(same ) ;  F E D .  R. ApI'. P 4 ( b ) ( 4 )  (criminal appeals) .  
1 55.  507 U.S.  380 ( 1 993).  
156. See id. at 382-�3 . 
157.  See, e.g . .  Pincay Y. A ndrews. 389 F.3d 853. 860 (9th Cir. 2004) (applying Piolleer Invest­
ment to the interpretation of Appellate Rule 4 (a ) (5 ) ) ;  Yesudian ex rei. Uni ted States v. Howard 
Univ .. 270 F.3d 1)69. 97 1 ( D .C. Cir. 2001 )  (applying Pion eer [nvesfl7 lenf to the  interpretation of 
Civi l  Rule 6(b» . 
1 58. Pioneer Inves{mcllt. 507 U.S. a t  391 . 
159. frl. at 394-95 .  
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[T]he determination is at bottom an equitable one, taking account 
of al l  relevant circumstances . . .  inc1ud [ing] the danger of prejudice 
to the [other litigants], the length of the delay and its potential im­
pact on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, including 
whether it was within the reasonable control of the movant, and 
whether the movant acted in good faith . 1 60 
625 
The Pioneer Investm.ent Court stressed that its decision did not un­
dermine the enforcement of litigation deadlines. 1 6 1 Even though 
some instances of attorney negligence might qualify for an extension, 
it  is  always necessary to convince the court that the neglect is "excusa­
ble ."  " It is this requirement, " the Court stated, "that we believe will 
deter creditors or other parties from freely ignoring court-ordered 
deadlines in the hopes of winning a permissive reprieve. " 1 62 Clients, 
moreover,  cannot avoid the effects of their lawyers' failings simply by 
arguing that they themselves were blameless. Lawyers act as agents 
for their clients, and " clients must be held accountable for the acts and 
omissions of their attorneys . " 1 63 
At least under the circumstances of the Pioneer In vestment case it­
self, the lawyer's personal circumstances did not weigh heavily with 
the Court : the majority explicitly discounted " the fact that counsel was 
experiencing upheaval in his law practice at the time of the bar 
date." 1 6-+ It is possible ,  however, that this conclusion rested on the 
Court 's evaluation of the particular circumstances of the case . The 
lawyer in Pioneer In vestment had evidently been retained to represent 
the relevant creditors roughly a month and a half before he withdrew 
from his law firm, 1 65 so the Court might have reasoned th at the with­
drawal failed to provide a sufficiently strong excuse for the lawyer's 
failure to ascertain and comply with the bar date .  In cases in which a 
lawyer's personal difficulties were more stark, courts have sometimes 
been willing to recognize excusable neglect. The sudden, dire illness 
of a solo practitioner, for example , has supported such a finding. 1 66 
160. ld. at 395. 
161. ld. 
1 62.  ld. 
1 63 .  Id. at 390. Of course.  a n  exception to this principle exists i n  the criminal context  when 
defense counse l 's  performance is so deficient as to constitute ineffective assistance. See 16A 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL. .  FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROC EDURE § 3950.9 .  at 489 (4 th eel.  
20(8) ( ,, [A J ttorney fai l ures that result in an untimely appeal and that meet  the test  for constitu­
tion ally ineffective assistance of counsel are . . .  grounds for rehef even when the issue is raised 
after the running of Rule 4(b ) (  4)'s permissible extension period. "). 
1 64. Pioneer Investment. 507 U . S .  at 398. 
165 .  See id. a t  384. 
1 66. See, e.g .. Active G lass Corp . v .  Arch itectural  & Ornamental Iron Workers Local Union 
58U. 89lJ F. Supp. 1 228. 1 229. 1 232  ( S . D .N.Y.  1 995) (granting an extension of time to fi le a civil 
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In Pioneer Investlnent, one factor that appeared to sway the maj or­
ity was that the bar date was announced in a way that the Court be­
lieved would cause reasonable practitioners to overlook it: " [T]he 
notice of the bar date  provided by the B ankruptcy Court in this case 
was outside the ordinary course in bankruptcy cases . . . .  [O]rdinarily 
the bar date in a bankruptcy case should be prominently announced 
and accompanied by an explanation of its significance . " 1 67 Similarly, 
in some cases ,  courts have been willing to excuse tardiness when the 
failure to meet the deadline resulted from reliance on misinformation 
provided by the court itself. l os It should be noted that-as discussed 
above1 69-some deadlines are jurisdictional, and failure to meet a ju­
risdictional deadline cannot be excused on the basis of the judicially 
created "unique circumstances" doctrine (a  doctrine that sometimes 
has excused reliance on misinformation from the court) . 1 70 However, 
reliance on misguidance from the court can nonetheless ground a find­
ing of "excusable neglect" under the subdivisions of Appellate Rule 4 
that permit the district court to provide a limited extension of the ap­
peal deadline,  even if that appeal deadline is jurisdictional. 1 7 1  
Courts vary in  their willingness to  excuse a litigant for relying on 
misinformation from the court , particularly when the misinformation 
concerns a point of law that strikes the judge as obvious. A notable 
case in point concerns the deadlines for tolling motions under the 
Civil Rules. l 72 Although it is well established that the district court 
has no power to extend those deadlines, 1 73 both litigants and judges 
sometimes overlook this fact .  Thus, it is possible that a court might 
find excusable neglect when a party, relying on a district court ' s  pur­
ported extension of a tolling motion deadline, failed to timely file a 
appeal when a solo practitioner was hospitalized with cancer. undergoing chemotherapy. and 
unable to communicate by phone). 
1 67 .  Pion eer In vest/nen!. 507 U.S. at  398. 
1 68. See. for example. Mennen Co. v. Gillette Co .. 7 1 9  F.2d 568. 571 (2d Cir. 1983), stating 
that 
[tJhe record does not appear to us to support an inference of procrastination, inepti tude 
or dilatoriness on Mennen's part .  Rather. i t  reflects good faith error by a party who 
was deceived by a chain of unfortunate events upon which it was entit led to .  and did, 
rely .  Accordingly. we find that the trial court abused its discretion in deciding that 
Mennen had failed to make a showing of excusable neglect so as to extend the time to 
serve and fi le its notice of appea l .  
1 69. See slIpra Part LA. 
1 70. See slIpra note 30 and accompanying text .  
1 7 1 .  See WR.IC; f-rr ET A L  . . supra note 1 62. § 3950.3 .  at 295-96 (d iscussing extensions of the time 
to lake a civil  appeal) .  
1 72 .  See F ED  R.  CIv.  P.  50(b) .  Cd) : 52(b) :  S9 (b ) .  (d)-(e) .  
1 73 .  S'ee FED. R. CTv. P. 6(b ) ( 2 ) .  
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notice of appeal . 1 74 Such a result is not, however, guaranteed; the 
scorn with which some courts have viewed a l itigant's failure to recog­
nize the non extendable nature of the tolling motion deadlines suggests 
that a refusal to grant an appeal-time extension on that basis might 
well be affirmed.  Prizevoits v. Indiana Bell Telephone Co. provides an 
example. 1 75 In  Prizevoits, the panel majority dismissed the appeal on 
the ground that the district j udge abused her discretion in extending 
the time to appeal. 1 76 The core fact, for the maj ority, was how obvi­
ous it is that tolling motion deadlines are nonextendable: 
Rule 6(b) makes plain . . .  that the IO-day l imit on fil ing a Rule 
59( e) motion cannot be extended . . . .  The federal rules are com­
plex-a minefield for lawyers not experienced in federal practice­
but Prizevoits' principal lawyer is a highly experienced federal l i ti­
gator. He must know about Rule 6(b) .  An unaccountable lapse is 
not excusable neglecL l 77 
As Prizevoits demonstrates, some courts are unwilling to excuse 
noncompliance with the federal rules even if the rules in question are 
counterintuitive . A good example is provided by the treatment of Ap­
pellate Rule 4(a) (4) during the period from 1979 to 1993,  when it pro­
vided that the filing of a post judgment motion permanently nullified 
any prior notice of appeal . l 7R This feature of Rule 4( a)( 4) was so 
counterintuitive-and so widely problematic-that the rulemakers 
termed it a " trap for an unsuspecting litigant" and eliminated it . 1 79 
But prior to that amendment some courts refused to extend the ap­
peal time when a litigant failed to realize that the post judgment mo­
tion had nullified the prior notice of appea1. 1 SO On the other hand, 
courts occasionally excuse a failure that results from a mistake of law. 
It seems that this is most likely to occur if the litigant can convince the 
174. See. e. g . .  Varhol v.  r-:at ' l  R.R. Passenger Corp., 909 F.2d 1557. 1563 (7th Cir .  1 990)  (en 
bane)  (somewhat grudgingly holding the appeal t imely where " [t Jhe tria l  judge found that  
Varhol's failure to fi le  a t imely notice of appeal  resul ted from his reliance on the extension of  
time to  file the  new trial motion and the consideration of tha t  motion on the  meri t s" ) .  
1 75 .  Prizevoits v.  Ind .  Be l l  Tel .  Co. ,  76 F.3d 1 32 (7th  Cir. 1 996) . 
1 76. See ie!. a t  US. 
1 77 .  [d. at  1 33 .  
1 78. See WRI( ;/-II ET. A L  . . sup ra note 1 62 .  § 3950.4. at 322-24 ( discussing the version of Appel­
late Rule 4 (a ) (4 )  that existed from 1 979 to 1 993 ) .  
1 79 .  FED. R .  App .  P .  4(a ) (4 )  ( 1 993 Committee Note ) .  
1 80. See Weinstock v .  Cleary. Gottlieb. S teen & Hamilton. H i  F.3e1 501 .  503 (lei Cir. 1 994) 
( " [TJhe e limination of R ule 4(a ) (4) 's · trap· has come too late for Weinstock. and we are satisfied 
that  the D istrict Court  Judge did not exceeel her discre tion by not excusing Weins tock when he 
fe l l  into the trap. " ) . 
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court that any reasonable lawyer-or the judge herself-might com­
mit a similar error. l 8 l  
In  this regard, i t  may be interesting to  observe how courts treat mis­
takes that occur as a result of the transition to electronic filing. 
Case law on this issue seems most likely to develop when district 
courts permit the notice of appeal to be filed electronically and practi­
tioners who are unfamiliar with electronic filing encounter difficulties. 
The federal courts ' Case Management/Electronic Case Filing ( CM/ 
ECF) system is now in use in all ninety-four federal district courts , and 
the courts of appeals are in the process of making the transition to 
CM/ECF. 1 82 Some, though not all, district courts permit litigants to 
file the notice of appeal electronically. 1 83 
A recent case involving electronic filing in the Court of Interna­
tional Trade (CIT) illustrates the types of errors that might occur 
when lawyers are not familiar with the electronic system.  In that case, 
an attorney waited until the last day of the appeal period before at­
tempting to use the CIT's electronic filing website to file  a notice of 
appeal. I S4 He entered the requisite information and proffered pay­
ment, but because he logged off before reaching the final confirma­
tion, the system did not record the filing. l ss He realized the mistake 
the next day and reentered the filing, which was then duly recorded. I So 
The Federal Circuit , remanding for the lower court to determine 
whether to extend the appeal time, opined that these facts constituted 
" a  strong showing of excusable neglect . " 1 87 The CIT, on remand, 
granted the extension . 1 88 It seems like ly that the courts in this case 
were swayed not only by the traps that e lectronic filing can pose for 
new users , but also by the lawyer's diligence in double-checking the 
following day whether the initial filing had worked. For lawyers, then, 
cases such as this one illustrate both the perils of e lectronic filing and 
1 8 1 .  See, e.g. . Lorenzen v. Employees Ret .  Plan of the Sperry & Hutchinson Co" Inc . .  896 
F.2d 228. 233 (7th Cir. 1990) (weighing. inter alia. the fact that " the error was a natura l  one" ) .  
1 82 .  See About CM/ECF. http://www.uscourts.gov!cmecf/cmecCabout.html ( last visited Jan .  
1 9 .  2010).  
1 83 .  Compare, e.g. . U.S. Dist.  Ct. Rules E.D. Cal., CM/ECF Procedures � C. 1 7  ("A Notice of 
Appeal should be filed e lectronical ly.  " ) . with U.S. Dist. Ct .  Rules N.D. Cal . ,  General Order 45. 
pt. XI  ( , 'Unti l  such time as the Uni ted States Courts of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and the 
Federal Circuit insti tute rules and procedures to accommodate E lectronic Case Filing. notices of 
appeal to those courts shall be fi led, and fees paid. in  the traditional manner on paper rather 
than electronica lly.  " ) .  
1 84. See Gilda Indus . .  Inc. v .  United States, 5 1 1  F .3d 1 348. 1 350 ( Fed. Cir. 2008 ) .  
1 85 .  See id. 
1 86.  See id. 
187 .  frl. at  1 352.  
1 88 .  See Gilda Industries. I nc.  v .  United Sta tes. 300 F. App·x. 9 12 .  Y 1 4 . 2008 WL 5U00238. at  
" ' 1  ( Fed. Cir. 200R ) ( unpublished opinion ) (noting the CIT's finding of excusable neglect ) .  
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the need for diligence in double-checking one's compliance with key 
deadlines . 
These examples demonstrate that a j udge's perspective on exten­
sion requests may well be shaped by the judge's views concerning the 
capacities of lawyers . Just as legislators ' imposition of deadlines on 
court action should be informed by realistic perspectives concerning 
the tasks of judging, 1 89 so too should judges' decisions concerning 
whether to enforce a deadline be informed by a realistic sense of what 
can and should be expected of lawyers . 
IV. LAWYERS ' INTERACTIONS 
Finally, litigation deadlines provide a context within which to ob­
serve the way that lawyers relate to each other, both within and 
among firms, and both as adversaries and allies. 
On the subject of the interaction among lawyers within a firm, one 
might for example consider the role of junior lawyers. Amendments 
to the national time computation rules took effect on December 1, 
2009. One innovation in the amendments is a default rule that, for 
filings made electronically, the last day of a period ends at midnight 
rather than at the closing of the clerk's office. 1 90 ll1is change may be 
welcomed by litigators who thereby gain a few extra hours in a given 
case ; and the option of electronic filing can reduce cost and inconve­
nience . However, one predictable effect of this change is that, in 
many instances, the lawyers' work will extend right up to the hour of 
the filing deadline-and, at least in large law firms, the brunt of those 
late nights may fall on the more j unior lawyers on the team. 
On the subject of interaction among lawyers representing different 
parties, one obvious point is that many litigation deadlines can be and 
often are extended by agreement of the parties. Lawyers ' willingness 
to agree to such extensions might provide one measure of the level of 
professional courtesy within a given legal market. On the other hand , 
mutual willingness to agree to extensions might sometimes pose sys­
temic problems even if it benefits lawyers. This would be true , for 
example, if the waiver of certain deadlines led to inordinate delays. 1 9 1 
Such systemic concerns may explain why certain deadlines-such as 
189. See supra text accompanying notes 1 3 1 - 1 32 .  
1 90. 5('1', e.g. . FED.  R.  CIv. P. 6(a) (4) .  
1 9 1 .  51.'!!. e . g  . . F E D .  R. CIv. P. 29(b)  (" [ A  J s t ipulation extending the t i m e  for allY form o f  
discovery must have court approval i f  i t  would inte rfere with the time s e t  for completing discov­
ery. for hearing a motion. or for tr ia ! . " ) .  
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those for post judgment motions-are simply not extendable , even if 
all parties and the court prefer an extension .  1 92 
On the other end of the spectrum, lawyers' qualms about uncooper­
ative opponents surface when they discuss other aspects of litigation 
deadlines. The "three-day rule" provides an example. Versions of 
this rule exist in the Civil ,  Criminal, B ankruptcy, and Appellate 
Rules . I ,)3 Under the three-day rule ,  when a litigation deadline is mea­
sured from the service of papers on a litigant, three days are added to 
the end of the period if the papers are served using certain specified 
means, which include mail or e lectronic service . The three-day rule 
originated in a time (before electronic service) when it was thought 
fair to add the extra time in order to offset the time taken in the mai l .  
Now that electronic service is  becoming the norm, a number of com­
mentators have called for the revision or elimination of the three-day 
rule . ! ')4 B ut some practitioners defend the rule,  particularly on the 
ground that if it were eliminated, lawyers could disadvantage their op­
ponent by, for example, serving papers electronically late on the eve­
ning before a holiday weekend . 1 95 
Another example of the link between timing and lawyers' interac­
tions can be found in Appellate Rule 29, which requires an amicus to 
file its brief seven days after the filing of the brief of the party the 
amicus supports . l 96 The idea behind the staggered timing is that the 
amicus should review the party's brief so as to avoid duplicative argu­
ments. ! 97 The provision of the seven-day time lag reflects the notion 
that the amicus is an unbiased participant who is distanced from the 
parties ;  in other words, the time lag rationale assumes that the amicus 
will not have had the opportunity to review an advance copy of the 
party's brief before it is filed . In practice, amici and the parties whose 
positions they support often share drafts of their respective briefs . 
1 92 .  See F E D .  R. CIv. P. 6 (b) (2 ) .  
193 .  See FED.  R. CIv. P .  6 (d) :  F E D .  R. CRIM .  P. 45 (c ) ;  FED. R.  B A N K R .  P.  9006(f): F E D .  R. 
ApI' .  P.  26(c ) .  
1 94. See Minutes of  the Judicial Conference Committee on Rules of  Practice and Procedure, 
June 9-1 0. 2008. at 5 .  
1 95 .  Such timing problems can occur even under the current system. Professor Schlanger. for 
example.  has recounted her experience with motions under the PLRA's termination provision: 
When I was a lawyer for the Department of Jus tice . . . I recall that one state filed a 
dozen such motions-one in each of its corrections cases-on July 3 .  and served them 
by mail .  The lead lawyer on the case i n  which I was involved did not open the motion 
until after a long weekend and several days vacation. about a week later.  On a thirty­
day timcline, that lost week was very precious. 
Schlanger. SlIpl'll note ] 30. at 591 n . 1 29 .  
1 96. See FED. R .  ApI'. P. 29(  e) .  
1 lJ7 .  Sec iii. ( 1 998 Committee Note ) .  
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V. CONCLUSION 
This brief and incomplete survey has not attempted to offer a uni­
fied theory of litigation deadlines. Rather, the goal of this Article is to 
suggest that the treatment of deadlines is embedded in a network of 
assumptions-by various actors in the system-about their own and 
others' roles. Litigation deadlines are neither selected nor enforced in 
a vacuum. The choice of a particular deadline may serve various 
goals, such as protecting litigants , ensuring prompt case processing, or 
safeguarding the finality of judgments. The interpretation and appli­
cation of a deadline, statutory or otherwise, should take into account 
its purposes. Judgments by legislators and courts concerning the tim­
ing of litigation can reveal underlying views about the nature of judg­
ing and lawyering. The more realistic those underlying views, the 
better for the system. 
